无论怎样长篇累牍地去谈组合，我们仍然要说，仅仅把光圈聚焦在组合上这还 不够。还应该进一步缩小焦点，看看是否有更核心的秘密隐在其中。如果不能洞悉 如何组合才是最好的秘诀，那么，即使不得要领地组合上它一百次，也无补于事。
战争史上，从来没有过一次胜利是在四平八稳中获得的。所以，在各种版本的 《军语》中，才会有主攻方向、主要突击目标、佯攻、佯动、迂回包抄这样一些区 分行动主次的术语。隐在这些术语背后的，相信不仅仅是出于“兵不厌诈”的考虑， 或是为了合理使用兵力。肯定还有别的原因。凭着直觉，所有那些赢得过无数胜仗 的赫赫名将或无名之辈，都意识到了有一种或许应被称为“胜律”的东西的存在， 并千万次地接近过它。但时至今日，还没有一位统帅或是一位哲人敢说，我找到了 它，甚至连对这种规律的命名都不曾完成。其实它一直就隐藏在人类此起彼伏的军 事实践中。可以说，每一次经典式的胜战都验证了它。只是每一次，人们都不肯承 认或不敢肯定自己与胜律迎面相遇，而常常把它归结于神秘命运的垂青。许多“马 后炮”式的战史专著，也由于把它描绘得过于玄妙而使人最终不得要领。但，胜律 的的确确是存在的。它就在那里，它像个隐身人伴随着人类的每一场战争，它的金 手指倒向谁一边，谁就会踏着战败者的悲伤穿过凯旋门。不过，即使是那些战争骄 子，也从未真正目睹过它的真实面孔。
“一切都是数”。古智者毕达哥拉斯 沿着这条思想之路，与一组神秘的数 字不期而遇：0.618。结果，他发现了黄金分割律！
从那以后，2500年间，这个公式一直被造型艺术家们奉为美学的金科玉律，艺 术史令人信服地证明了，不管是信手拈来还是刻意为之，几乎所有被人们称为杰作 的艺术品，都在其基本的美学特征方面近似或符合这一公式。人们曾长时间惊讶于 古希腊巴特农神庙的美轮美奂，几疑为神迹。经过测算，才发现它的垂直线和水平 线之间的关系， 竟完全符合1:0.618的比例。当代建筑学大师柯布西埃在他的《走 向新建筑》一书中，也是根据黄金分割律，创立了他最重要的“设计基本尺度”理 论，而这一理论对全世界的建筑师和建筑物都产生了深广的影响 。可惜，这一 或许是造物用一个领域向人类暗示全部领域规律的公式，在漫长的时空隧道中，从 未走出过艺术创造的天地。除了那些天赋过人的缪斯们，几乎没有什么人意识到这 条黄金般的美律，同时也可能会成为或者干脆就是其它领域中同样需要遵从的规律。 直到1953年， 美国人J·基弗才发现，用黄金分割律寻找试验点，能够最快地逼近 最佳状态。 他的这一发现被中国数学家华罗庚归纳为“优选法”，亦叫0.618法。 并一度在中国广为传播。虽然就我们所知，这种人海战术式的普及运动，收效甚微， 但它却显示出黄金律在艺术之外的领域中运用的前景。
其实，早在自觉把握黄金律的意识产生之前，人们已经凭着直觉，反复地将它 运用在了各自的实践领域。这里面自然不会遗漏军事领域。从战争史上那些令人称 绝的著名战役和战斗中，我们很容易就能找出这头神秘野兽飘忽不定的爪痕。
无须把目光投向很远，你会发现，与这一定律相合的例子，在军事天地间几乎 俯拾即是。从马刀锋刃的弧度，到子弹、炮弹、弹道导弹沿弹道飞行的顶点，从飞 机进入俯冲轰炸状态的最佳投弹高度和距离 ，到补给线的长短与战争转折点的 关系，无处不见0.618的形影。（本章正文中注释至序号原书未标出，由扫 校者订正——扫校者识）
信手翻翻战史， 你一定暗暗吃惊，0.618，如一条金带蜿蜒隐现于古今中外的 战争中。春秋时期的晋楚鄢陵之战，晋厉公率军伐郑，与援郑之楚军决战于鄢陵。 厉公听从楚叛臣苗贲皇的建议，以中军之一部进攻楚军之左军；以另一部进攻楚军 之中军，集上军、下军、新军及公族之卒，攻击楚之右军。其主要攻击点的选择， 恰在黄金分割点上 。我们在前面提到过亚历山大与大流士的阿贝拉之战，马其 顿人把他们的攻击点，选在了波斯军队的左翼和中央结合部，巧的是，这个部位正 好也是整个战线的“黄金点”。
数百年来，人们对成吉思汗的蒙古骑兵，为什么能像飓风般席卷欧亚大陆颇感 费解。因为仅用蛮族人的悍野、残忍、诡谲以及骑兵的机动性这些理由，都还不足 以对此做出令人完全信服的解释。或许还有别的更为重要的原因？果然，黄金分割 律再次显示出它的神奇：我们发现，蒙古骑兵的战斗队形与西方传统的方阵大不相 同。 在它的5排制阵型中，重骑兵和轻骑兵的比例为2:3，人盔马甲的重骑兵为2， 快捷灵动的轻骑兵为3， 又是一个黄金分割！你不能不佩服那位马背思想家的天才 妙悟，被这样的统帅统领的大军，比在战场上与它对峙的欧洲军队更具冲击力，是 理所当然的事。
基督教欧洲人除了把黄金律运用到宗教艺术方面天赋甚高外，对这一定律在其 它方面是否有用，似乎开悟得很晚。直到黑火药时期，滑膛枪渐渐呈现取代长矛之 势，率先将滑膛枪兵和长矛兵对半混编，以改造传统方阵的荷兰将军摩利士，仍未 能意识到这一点。还是瑞典国王古斯塔夫对这种正面强侧面弱的阵型进行调整后， 才使瑞典军队成为当时欧洲最有战斗力的军队。 他的做法是，在摩利士原来的216 名长矛兵＋198名滑膛枪兵中队之外， 增加96名滑膛枪兵，这一改变顿时突出了火 器的作用， 使之成为了冷热兵器时代军队阵型的分水岭。不言而喻的是，198＋96 名滑膛枪兵与216长矛兵之比，让我们又一次看到了黄金律的光斑。
还不止是这些。看看吧，在我们承认它为艺术规律之外的规律之前，它是怎样 近乎固执地一次次“显形” ，向我们发出明确提示的。1812年6月，拿破仑进攻俄 国。 9月，他在未能消灭俄军有生力量的博罗金诺战役后，进入了莫斯科，这时的 拿破仑并未意识到，天才和运气正从他身上一点点消失，他一生事业的顶峰和转折 点正在同时到来。一个月后，法军便在大雪纷飞中撤离了莫斯科，三个月的胜利进 军加上两个月的盛极而衰，从时间轴上看，法兰西皇帝透过熊熊烈焰俯瞰莫斯科城 时，脚下正好就踩着黄金分割线。130年后的另一个6月，纳粹德国启动了针对苏联 的“巴巴罗萨”计划。在长达两年多的时间里，德军一直保持着进攻的势头，直到 1943年8月， “城堡”行动结束，德军从此转入守势，再没能对苏军发起一次可以 称之为战役行动的进攻。或许我们还需要把这样一个事实也称之为巧合：被所有战 史学家们公认为苏联卫国战争转折点的斯大林格勒战役，不早不晚，就发生在战争 爆发的第17个月， 也就是1942年的 11月，这正是德军由盛而衰的26个月时间轴上 的“黄金点”。
让我们再来看看海湾战争。战前，据军事专家估计，如果共和国卫队的装备和 人员，经空中轰炸损失达到或超过30％，就将基本丧失战斗力。为了使伊军的损耗 达到这个临界点，美军一再延长轰炸时间。直到“沙漠军刀”出鞘时，伊军在战区 内的4280辆坦克中的38％、2280辆装甲车中的32％、3100门火炮中的47％都已被摧 毁， 这时的伊军实力已经降至60％左右，透过这些残酷的数据，0.618的神秘之光 在1991年1月24日的清晨开始再次闪烁。100小时后，“沙漠风暴”的地面战斗便宣 告结束。
这些散落在历史尘烟中的事例，真是不可思议。孤立地看上去，它们太像是一 个接一个的偶然了。但造物从来不会做没来由的事。如果有太多的偶然，都在显示 同一种现象，你还能继续心平气静地把它们看做是偶然吗？不，这时候你必须承认， 那就是规律。
在汉语的语法中，有一种基本的句式结构。这种结构把一个句子或词组，分为 修饰词和中心词两部分。它们之间的关系是修饰与被修饰，即前者修饰后者，前者 确定后者的倾向和特征。说得明白些，前者是容貌，后者是机体，我们确认一个人 或一件物与他人或它物不同，一般都是根据他（它）的容貌和外观，而不是根据他 （它）的机体或机理。从这个角度说，修饰词相对于中心词而言，更应被视为句子 或词组中的重心。比如，红苹果。在被“红”修饰之前，苹果，只不过是此种果品 的泛指，仅具有一般性。而“红”，则使这只苹果具有了可以认定其为“这一个” 的特殊性。显然。“红”在这个词组中的地位举足轻重。再如，经济特区。如果没 有“经济”二字，特区只不过是个地域区划概念。被“经济”修饰过之后，它便获 得了一种特殊的属性和走向，成为邓小平用经济杠杆改革中国的支点。这一类的结 构就是汉语语法的基本型态之一：
这一以偏修饰正的结构在汉语中大量存在，以至于不使用它，讲汉语的人便无 法开口说话。因为在一个句子中，如果仅仅有主体性词汇，而没有主导性修饰，将 使这个句子因缺少程度、 方位、 形态等可让人具体把握的因素而失去明晰性。如 “好人”、“坏事”、“高楼”、“红旗”、“慢跑”这一类词，假如把前缀的修 饰词统统去掉，后面所有的中心词，便全都变成了没有具体能指的中性词。由此可 见，在偏正式结构中，与“正”相比，“偏”处于一种给句子和词组定性的地位。 就是说，从某种意义上，我们可以这样理解，偏正式结构以中心词为主体，以修饰 词为主导，“正”是“偏”的躯体，而“偏”则是“正”的灵魂。当躯体作为一种 前提确立之后，灵魂的作用显然更具决定性意义。这种主体从属于主导的关系，是 偏正式结构得以存在的基础，同时，作为与客观世界对应的符号系统的结构方式之 一，它似乎在向我们暗示某种超出语言范畴的规律性的东西。
顺着这条路径走下去， 我们很快就会看出， 不仅仅在“好人”、“坏事”、 “高楼”、“红旗”这类词组，也不仅仅在航空母舰、巡航导弹、隐形飞机、装甲 运兵车、自行火炮、精确炸弹以及快速反应部队、空地一体战、联合作战这类军语 中，偏正关系大量存在。在语言范畴之外的世界里，同样层层叠叠地布满了这种关 系。这正是我们借用——仅仅是借用——而不是照搬这一人类语言系统中仅见的修 辞方法于自己理论中的意义所在，我们无意把战争与修辞学生拉硬拽在一起，而只 是想借用“偏－正”这一语词来阐示自己理论中最核心的部分，因为我们认定在许 多事物的运动和发展中都大量存在着偏与正的关系，并且在这种关系中常常是“偏” 而不是“正”在其中起主导性作用，这种作用我们姑且称之为“以偏修正”（注意， 这不是作为修辞方法的偏正式结构的本意，而只是我们的引伸）。如一个国家，人 民是主体，而政府是国家的主导；一支军队，士兵和中下层军官是主体，而统帅部 是军队的主导；一次核爆炸，铀或钚是主体，而对它们的轰击手段是引发链式反应 的主导；一次东南亚式的金融危机，受害国是主体，而金融投机家是造成危机的主 导。没有政府的主导，人民就是一盘散沙；没有统帅部的主导，士兵就是乌合之众； 没有轰击手段，铀和钚就是一堆矿物质；没有金融投机家的兴风作浪，受害国的调 节机制理应能使它们避开一场金融浩劫。在此类关系中，抛开双向互动的因素不谈， 谁是偏谁是正，谁修饰谁，可以说不言而喻。
以上论述表明，这种偏正式结构是一种非对称性结构，因而偏与正之间是一种 非均衡的关系。在这点上，与黄金分割律的情况非常相似：0.618与1之间就既是一 种非对称结构，又是一种非均衡关系。我们完全有理由把它也看做是另一种表述的 偏正式。因为在偏正结构中，重要的是偏，而不是正。黄金分割律亦如此，重要的 是0.618，而不是1。这是两者间共同的特征。规律告诉我们，在两个特征相似的事 物之间，一定存在着某种相似的规律。如果在黄金分割与偏正结构之间确实存在共 同规律的话，那就应该是：
最能说明这一点的，大概非田忌赛马的典故莫属了。在总体实力处于下风的情 况下，大军事家孙膑挥洒出了他足以代表古中国博弈智慧的经典之作。他以田忌的 下马对齐王的上马作开局，在输掉必丢的一局后，再用己方的中马和上马，连克对 方的下马和中马，确保了获胜所需的两局优势 。这种以丢一保二策略（主导） 去赢取整个赛局（主体）的方式，可以被看做是一种典型的偏正式结构。而其三局 两胜的结果，则又完全符合2：3的黄金比率。在这里，我们看到的是完美的二律汇 流、二律合一：
找到规律是研究问题的结果，也是研究问题的开始。只要我们相信有一个名曰 偏正律的东西普遍贯穿于事物的运行之中，我们就应该相信，这一规律同黄金律一 样不会独独在军事领域留下空白。
齐鲁长勺之战。两军对阵，齐军来势汹汹，鲁军按兵不动。齐军擂了三通鼓、 冲了三回阵，仍未撼动鲁军阵脚，气势明显低落。鲁军趁机反攻，大获全胜。战后， 谋士曹刿向鲁庄公点破了此役齐败鲁胜的道理：敌军“一鼓作气，二而衰，三而竭。 彼竭我盈，故克之” 。从整个战役的进程来看，此战可分五个阶段：齐军一鼓 ——齐军再鼓——齐军三鼓——鲁军反攻——鲁军追击。从第一到第三阶段，曹刿 采取了避敌锋芒的策略，使齐军在没能取得任何战果的情况下，便迅速越过了自己 攻击力的黄金点，而鲁军则准确地选择此点为反攻时机，在2700年前的战场上充分 印证了黄金分割律（3:5G0.618） 。可以肯定，当时的曹刿，绝不可能知晓晚于他 200年的毕达哥拉斯和他的黄金分割理论。 况且，就是他知道这一理论，也不可能 在一场正在进行的战事中， 准确地测知哪里是它的0.618。但他却凭直觉猜测到了 这一闪烁黄金光芒的分割点，而这正是所有天才军事家们共有的禀赋。
汉尼拔在坎尼之战中，与曹刿的思路如出一辙。他也像曹刿一样洞悉敌人攻击 力递减的奥秘。因而他一反常态，把最弱的高卢军和西班牙步兵，投放在本应布署 精锐的阵线中部，让他们去正面经受罗马军队的攻击，待其支撑不住后，战线上便 逐渐出现了一个新月形凹陷。这弯不知是汉尼拔刻意营造还是意外形成的新月，变 成了消解罗马军队攻击力的巨大缓冲器。当这一强劲力量因战线的拉长逐次衰减， 在接近迦太基人阵线的底部而呈强弩之末时，总体上处于劣势但在骑兵上却占优势 的迦太基人，不失时机地让其铁骑两翼齐飞，迅速完成了对罗马军队的合围，把坎 尼变成了宰杀7万生灵的屠场。
这两次有着异曲同工之妙的战役，都把避敌锋芒、挫敌锐气作为主导性策略， 采取了明显偏离正面决战的作战模式，恰到好处地把敌方攻击力的衰竭点，作为己 方反击的最佳时机，在战法上明显地符合黄金律和偏正律。
如果不把这两个战例，看做是一种巧合或孤立现象，那么我们就会在战史中更 多地看到黄金律－偏正律在闪闪发光。这一点在现代战争中也许更加明显。二战时， 德军进攻法兰西的战役，从头至尾都浸透了我们所说的这二律的精髓。无论是将坦 克从步兵的配属变成主战兵器，还是抛开一战时的套路把闪击战作为主战理论，以 及不但出乎敌人、甚至出乎德军统帅部里那些观念陈旧的老将军的意料，把阿登山 口选为德军进攻的主导方向，所有这些在当时的人眼里，肯定都不合正统，明显地 带有“偏”向性。正是这一偏向，导致了整个德军军事思想的根本性转变，也使史 里芬伯爵“袖拂英吉利海峡”的梦想，成了英国人在敦克尔刻的噩梦。而此前谁会 想到，这一奇迹的蓝图，竟绘自两个级别较低的军官——曼施坦因和古德里安之手？ 
在同一场大战中，可与进攻法兰西战役这种明显具有偏正式倾向的作战行动相 映照的，还可举出日本袭击珍珠港的例子。山本五十六对航母的使用一如古德里安 对坦克。虽然在山本的意识里，仍把战列舰视为未来海上决战的主体力量，但却又 敏感并且正确地将航空母舰及其舰载机选作了对美海军作战的主导兵器。更为令人 击节之处，是他在对美国人下手时，避开了对美国本土漫长的太平洋沿岸的正面攻 击，同时又充分考虑到了他的联合舰队的攻击半径，也就是他的拳头所能打到的最 佳位置，从而挑选了既对扼制整个太平洋举足轻重，又让美国人事先得到情报都不 肯相信的夏威夷作为攻击点，值得一提的是，这位海上决战的信奉者在关乎未来战 局的第一场大战中，选择的不是他心向神往的海战，而是对珍珠港的偷袭。结果， 他剑走偏锋，出奇制胜。
分析到这一步，我们应该已经懂得，不管是黄金律还是偏正律，都不应从字面 上去狭义的理解，而只能在本质上把握其精髓。瞬息万变的战场从来不会给任何一 位军事统帅或指挥官，留出足够的时间或提供足够的信息，让他一分分去丈量何处 是黄金分割点， 一寸寸去考虑如何把握偏正度的问题。甚至就连0.618和“偏”， 这两个二律中最核心的要素本身，也不是数学意义上的常数。而是胜利之神在千变 万化的战争、战场、战局中不断出没隐现的万千化身。
有时表现在攻击点的选择上，如特拉法尔加海战中的纳尔逊，极其聪明地 把法国舰队的后卫而不是前锋定为主要打击点，使一场海战的胜利导致了一个海上 帝国的诞生；
有时表现在战机的选择上，如第四次中东战争，萨达特把埃军越过苏伊士运河 的D日， 选在正处于穆斯林斋月中的十月六日，而把发起进攻的时间，定在阳光由 西向东直刺以色列人瞳孔的下午，一举改写了以军不可战胜的神话；
有时表现在兵力的非均衡配置上，如一战前德军统帅部制定的入侵法国的“史 里芬计划”，大胆地把其72个师中的53个集中在右翼作为主攻，而把剩下的19个师 放在漫长战线的左翼和中部。如此一来，这个从未真正实施过的沙盘作业，竟成了 历史上最著名的战争计划；
有时表现在谋略的运用上， 如公元前260年，秦赵两国相争。秦昭襄王并不急 于马上同敌军决战，而是依照范睢建议，先攻韩国之上党，使赵国失去依恃；又假 意言和，使诸侯不再援赵；再施反间之计，使赵王撤大将廉颇而任用纸上谈兵的赵 括，最终大败赵军于长平。这一仗秦胜赵负的原因，与其说正得于秦军的强大，不 如说偏得于范睢的谋略。
值得我们重视和研究的还有另外一种迹象，即越来越多的国家，在事关政治、 经济和国防安全等重大问题上，把视线偏离出军事领域之外，用其它手段补充、丰 富甚至替代军事手段，以达到仅凭武力无法达到的目的。这是从战争观上对战争进 行的最大的一次以偏修正。同时也预示着，未来战争将愈加频繁地呈现出军事手段 与其它手段进行偏正式组合的趋势。
以上种种，不论是哪种选择，都无不带有“偏”的特性。偏正律和黄金律一样， 反对一切形式的平行并列、均衡对称、面面俱到、四平八稳，而主张剑走偏锋。只 有避免锤砧硬碰，你的剑锋才会如庖丁解牛，游刃有余。这就是战争这篇千古文章 中最基本的胜利语法。
在构成一个事物的诸多内部因素中，一定会有某个因素在全部因素中占据突出 或主导的地位。这个因素与其它因素的关系如果是和谐的、完美的，那么，它就总 会在什么地方符合0.618:1的公式。 当然也就会符合偏正律。因为在这里，“全部 因素”就是主体，就是正；“某个因素”则为主导，则为偏。当一个事物具有了特 定的目的性之后，偏与正，就构成了主从关系。二牛相斗，正是牛，偏就是它的犄 角；双刀相向，正是刀，偏就是它的锋刃。孰主孰从，一目了然。而当目的发生变 化时，新的主导因素就会出现并取代旧的主导因素，与现有的全部因素构成新的偏 正关系。捕捉住了事物中主与全的关系，就等于抓住了黄金律和偏正律的要义。
据此出发，我们很快可以从战争纷杂的脉系中，理出五根最主要的筋络：主兵 器与全兵器；主手段与全手段；主兵力与全兵力；主向度与全向度；主领域与全领 域。这“五主五全”，基本上概括了普遍存在于战争中的偏正关系。
仍以海湾战争为例，联军实施“沙漠风暴”的主兵器是隐形飞机、巡航导弹和 精确炸弹，其它全部兵器为从属；主手段是连续38天的空中轰炸，其它全部手段为 辅助；主兵力是空军，其它全部兵力为协同；主向度是以共和国卫队为重点打击对 象，其它全部战场目标服从于此；主领域是军事，其它领域则予以经济制裁、外交 孤立、媒体攻势之类的全面配合。
但，仅仅理清楚这层关系，还不是我们的目的。对从事战争的人而言，最重要 的不是理清而是如何把握和运用这些关系。我们知道，任何国家的战争资源都是有 限的，即使像美国这样国力雄厚的国家。在战争中也必须不断考虑效费比（“最小 耗能”原则）和怎样把仗打得更漂亮、让战果更辉煌的问题。因此，合理并且策略 地使用和分配战争资源，对任何国家来说都十分必要。这就需要找到正确的方法， 也就是如何在战争中自觉地运用偏正律。其实，不少国家早已在此前非自觉地运用 过了这一规律——
前苏联解体后，俄罗斯的军力每况愈下。不仅失去了昔日与美军对垒的超霸地 位，甚至连保证国家的现时安全都力不从心。在此情况下，俄军统帅部虽然被动， 但却适时地修正了自己的未来战略，把战术核武器乃至战略核武器，作为一旦发生 针对俄国的战争时的首选主导兵器，并围绕这一选择从整体上调整了常规兵器与核 兵器的配置结构。 与俄军相反， 因独执牛耳风头正健的美军，则把“全面优势” （陆军）、“由海向陆”（海军）、“全球参与”（空军）确立为新的三 军战略目标，并依此选择数字化装备、新型两栖攻击舰和隐形远程作战飞机作为新 一代兵器， 大有让其取代M－1系列坦克，航空母舰和F－16这些当代王牌，成为美 军武器库中的主导兵器之势。
从俄美对各自主导兵器的战略性调整，可看出那种以杀伤力大小为条件，选择 主导兵器的做法已经过时。对主兵器的选择来说，武器的杀伤力不过是兵器的诸多 技术性能之一。比技术性能更重要的是对战争目的、作战目标和安全环境的基本考 虑。因此，主兵器应是对达成上述目标最为有效的兵器，而且必须是能与其它兵器 有机组合，构成完整武器系统的主导性因素。在现代技术条件下，主兵器大都已不 是单一武器，而是“系统集成”，同时它又是更大的系统中的一部分。大量高 新技术的涌现，战争目标的不断调整，在为主兵器的选择及与其它兵器的组合使用 方面，提供了足够的上下行空间的同时，也使主兵器与其它全部兵器的主从关系变 得更加扑朔迷离。
同样的因素也在影响着战争手段的运用。在战争中，把军事行动天经地义的当 做主手段，而其它所有手段则被视为辅助手段的观念正在过时。也许过不了多久， 美国人就会发现，在对付像本·拉丹这样的恐怖组织的战争中，军事手段只是其全 部可动用手段中的一种，更为有效的、能对拉丹造成毁灭性打击的手段，很可能不 是巡航导弹，而是由它或更多手段配合的在网络上展开的金融封杀战。
手段的复杂化带来的是出乎一切军人意料的结果：战争的平民化。因此，在这 里，我们所说的主兵力与全兵力的问题，除了军队内部和作战行动中兵力的调度、 分配和运用，还包括全体民众在何种程度上对战争的参与。当非职业军人的战争或 准战争行动，越来越多地成为影响国家安全的重要因素时，谁是未来战争的主兵力， 正在全球范围内变成一个过去根本不是问题的问题。如我们已经在前面多次提到过 的“网徒”袭击美国和印度国防部网络中心的事件，即是这方面的证据。
无论是纯粹的战争行动，还是非战争军事行动，抑或非军事战争行动，只要是 带有作战性质的行动，便都存在一个怎样准确选择主要作战方向和攻击点的问题， 也就是在由整个战争、战场或战线构成的全向度上，确定你的主向度的问题。这几 乎是令一切即便拥有精良武器、多种手段、充足兵力的统帅也最感头疼的问题。但 像亚历山大、汉尼拔、纳尔逊、尼米兹之辈和中国古代的孙武、孙膑，却都是擅长 选择出敌不意的主攻方向的高手。利德尔·哈特也注意到了这一点，他把选择最出 敌预料的行动方向和抵抗力最弱的路线叫做“间接战略”。在战争空间已经由陆海 空天电广延至社会政治、经济、外交、文化乃至心理诸领域的今天，各种因素的交 叉互动，已使军事领域很难理所当然的成为每一场战争的主导领域。战争将在非战 争领域中展开，这样的观点说来很奇怪也很难让人接受，但越来越多的迹象表明， 趋势就是如此。其实远在古典战争时期，战争就不曾始终局限在单一领域中，像蔺 相如“完壁归赵”的外交战，或像墨子与公输班的虚拟战，都是在军事领域以外赢 得或消弥战争的典型范例。这种跨领域解决战争难题的方式，对当代人来说，应该 是一种启示。因为高度发达的技术综合时代，已为我们开辟出了远比古人广阔得多 的施展智慧和手段的领域，使人们梦寐以求的在非军事领域赢得军事胜利，用非战 争手段打赢战争的凤愿成为可能。如果我们想把未来战争的胜利紧紧攥在手里，就 必须对这一前景做好充分的思想准备，即在一场也许不是以军事行动为主导的领域 中，进行一场可能波及当事国全部领域的战争。至于这样一场战争将以什么武器、 什么手段、什么人员以及在什么方向、什么领域中进行，眼下当然还是一个未知数。
战争是最难说清也最让人琢磨不定的东西。它需要技术的支撑，但技术并不能 代替士气和谋略；它需要艺术的灵感，但又排斥浪漫和温情；它需要数学的精确， 但精确有时会使它陷于机械和僵硬；它需要哲学的抽象，但纯粹的思辨无助于把握 在铁与火的缝隙中稍纵即逝的战机。
战争没有定式。没有人敢在战争领域里口吐“半部《论语》治天下”的狂言， 没有人用一种战法打赢过所有的战争；但并不等于战争没有规律。为数不多的人在 常胜将军的花名册上签下了自己的名字，这是因为他们窥见和掌握了胜律。
这些名字证明了胜律的存在，只是却无人道破堂奥。很久——几乎和战争史一 样久——以来，人们都把它看成是划过天才统帅脑际的闪电，而很少意识到它就隐 藏于刀剑迸击、硝烟炮火的血腥格杀之中。
偏正律就是这样一层纸。它简单又复杂，飘忽又稳定，常常被一些幸运的手指 无意间捅穿，胜利之门便轰然向他洞开。它简单得可以用一组数字或一种语法去表 述；它复杂得即使你精通数学和语法也找不出答案；它飘忽得像硝烟，让人摸不着 边际；它稳定得像影子，伴随着每一次胜利的日出。
正因如此，我们把偏正律看做是原理，而不是定理。我们充分考虑到了这一原 理的相对性。相对的东西不能生搬硬套，无需精确测量。相对不是绝对的白色，所 以它不怕黑天鹅。
不过，即或我们通过对战史的研究，肯定偏正即胜律，但如何运用才算正确， 仍是有待每个具体的操作者自己去相机把握的问题。因为，战争中的二律背反现象， 一直在困惑着每个胜利的追逐者：违背规律者必败无疑；墨守陈规者也绝难胜利。 “六六三十六，数中有术，术中有数。阴阳燮理，机在其中，机不可设，设则不中”， 《三十六计》可谓一语道破天机。这就是说，不管我们能找出多少战例，证明其胜 利的原因与0.618相合， 但下一个严格按照黄金分割律去设计战争、战役或战斗的 人，几乎必定会啃到失败的涩果。无论是黄金律还是偏正律，重要的是把握精髓， 运用原理，而不能生吞活剥、东施效颦。在欧洲历史上著名的罗斯巴赫战役与吕岑 会战中，进攻的一方都采用了亚历山大式的“斜形攻击队形”，但结局却截然不同。 罗斯巴赫战役中的法奥联军指挥官照抄战史，在腓特烈大帝的眼皮底下调兵布阵， 企图用斜形队形攻击普鲁士军队的左翼。结果被及时调整了部署的普军，打得一败 涂地。一年后，腓特烈在吕岑与三倍于己的奥地利军队再次相遇。这回，他却妙手 新裁，同样用斜形攻击队形，一举全歼奥军。一样战法，两样结果，可谓意味深长 。它告诉我们，没有永远正确的战法，只有永远正确的规律。它同时还告诉我 们，正确的规律并不能包胜不败，胜利的秘诀在于对规律的正确运用。包括对偏正 律，虽然强调的是以偏修正，但也不是一味走偏就能取胜。偏，主要是思路要偏， 是本质上的偏，而不是形式上的偏。如在实战运用中，并不等于每一次都要把攻击 点， 生硬地选择在0.618式的“偏”上，才算符合了胜律。也许，这一次胜律恰恰 需要的就是正面突破。这一次，“正”就是“偏”。这就是战争的艺术性，是数学 、哲学或其它科学技术都无法替代的艺术性。正是在此意义上，我们敢于肯定， 军事技术革命替代不了军事艺术的革命。
另外需要点明的是，我们所说的偏正，虽然某些方面不可避免地与中国古代兵 家主张的“奇正”之法重合，但并不完全等同于“奇正”。因为，在古代兵家那里， 奇和正是交替使用的两种手段，即孙子所谓“凡战者，以正合，以奇胜。……战势 不过奇正，奇正之变，不可胜穷也。”偏正，则不是非此即彼的两种手段，而 是客观规律的呈现。最重要的区别还在于，虽然战争史上，出奇制胜的战例都因其 美妙绝伦而令人神往，但却并非所有的胜利都因出奇而取胜，以正取胜者也不乏其 例。偏正则不同，只要我们把每一个胜利拆开来看，不管它是奇胜还是正胜，其中 都一定可寻见胜律的踪影：即不是“奇”偏正，就是“正”偏正。
"I usually make surprising moves; the enemy expects surprising moves; but I move in an unsurprising manner this time to attack the enemy. I usually make unsurprising moves; the enemy expects unsurprising moves; but I move in a surprising manner this time to attack the enemy." --Li Shimin
However much is said about combination, we still have to say that it is not enough to focus on combination. It is necessary to further sharpen the focus, to see whether there is any secret closer to the core. Without understanding the secret of how to conduct combination, it will be useless to conduct combination 100 times incompetently.
In the history of war, there has never been a victory achieved in a smooth manner. Thus, in all its versions, the book Jun Yu [Military Talk] contains such terms as direction of main attack, main targets of striking, feint attack, feint move, and outflank which entail distinguishing between the main and secondary actions. What is behind such terms is not only consideration of the need to deceive the enemy or the sound use of force. There must be some other reasons. In terms of instinct, all those famous generals who have won countless victories, or obscure people, have all realized the existence of something which perhaps should be called "rules of victory." Those people have also got close to such rules tens of thousands of times. Nevertheless, to this day, no commander or philosopher has ever dared to say: I have found the rules. Not even the job of naming such rules has been completed. But, actually, the rules are hidden in the waves of military practice of mankind. It is proper to say that every classical victory has testified to the rules. However, each time, people either do not want to admit or do not dare to affirm their encounters with rules of victory, but, instead, often attribute the effects of the rules to the favor of some mysterious fate. Many "belated pronouncement" works on military history offer arguments which are difficult for people to grasp because the arguments describe the rules' effects in an excessively mysterious manner. But, rules of victory do exist. They are there. Like an invisible man, they accompany every war of mankind. The party to which their golden fingers point will go through the arch of triumph by stepping on the sorrow of the vanquished. However, even the victors in war have not truly seen their real faces.
Secretly Conforming to the Rule of the Golden Section
"Everything is a matter of numbers." Along this line of thought, the ancient sage Pythagoras  unexpectedly encountered a set of mysterious digits: 0.618. As a result, he found the rule of the golden section!
[A mathematical formula showing the derivation of the figure 0.618 omitted]
In the 2,500 years since then, this formula has been considered by formative artists as the golden rule of aesthetics. As convincingly testified to by the history of arts, almost all artistic works considered masterpieces, whether created in a casual manner or through intentional effort, have all been close to or in accord with this formula in their basic aesthetic features. People had long marveled at the beauty of the Parthenon Temple of ancient Greece, suspecting it to be the creation of a god. With measurement and calculation, it was found that the relationship between its vertical lines and horizontal lines were entirely in accord with the 1:0.618 ratio. In his book Vers Une Architecture, the great modern architect Le Corbusier also established his most important theory of "basic design scale" on the basis of the rule of the golden section, a theory which has had profound and extensive influence on architects and architecture in the world.  Regrettably, this formula which the Creator may have meant to use for revealing to mankind a rule for all spheres through a demonstration in one sphere has never moved beyond the realm of artistic creation. Except those Muses with extraordinary gifts, almost no one has realized that this golden rule of aesthetics may become, or is, a rule that should also be followed in other spheres.
It was not until 1953 that J. Kieffer, an American, discovered that seeking experiment points according to the rule of the golden section would make it possible to reach the optimal state the most quickly. His discovery was refined by the Chinese mathematician Hua Luogeng and turned into the "optimum seeking method," or the 0.618 method. The method was popularized in China for a time. As far as we know, such a popularization campaign based on the human-wave tactic produced little effect, but this episode demonstrated the prospect of applying the rule of the golden section in spheres other than the sphere of arts.  [The text does not indicate the location of footnotes 4-12, although they are included in the footnote section at the end of the chapter] In fact, before the emergence of the notion of consciously grasping the rule of the golden section, people had repeatedly applied it to their own spheres of practice on the basis of their instincts. Of course, the military sphere had not been left out. We can easily see the ephemeral marks of the paws of this mysterious beast in the famous amazing campaigns and battles in the history of war. Without looking afar, you will see examples of conforming to this rule everywhere in the military realm. The shadow of 0.618 can be seen in such things ranging from the arc of the cavalry sword to the apex of the flying trajectory of a bullet, shell, or ballistic missile and from the optimum bomb-release altitude and distance for an aircraft in the dive bombing mode to the relationship between the length of the supply line and the turning point in a war.
By casually reading pages of the history of war, you will be certain to be silently amazed by the fact that 0.618, like a golden belt, can be faintly seen in ancient, modern, Chinese, and foreign wars. In the Yanlin battle between Jin and Chu during the Spring and Autumn Period, Duke Li of Jin led a military force in attacking Zheng. The Jin force had a decisive battle with the Chu force at Yanlin. Adopting advice made by Miao Penghuan, a defector from Chu, Duke Li used a portion of his middle army to attack the left army of the Chu force, used another portion to attack the middle army of the Chu force, and used the upper army, lower army, new army, and forces of the lords to attack the right army of the Chu force. The point of attack selected was exactly at the point of the golden section. We mentioned above the Battle of Arbela between Alexander and Darius. The Macedonians selected the juncture of the left flank and the center of the Persian force as the point of their attack; marvelously, the point was exactly the "golden point" for the entire front.
For hundreds of years, people have found it difficult to understand why the Mongol cavalry of Gengis Khan were, like a hurricane, able to sweep across the Eurasian continent. Such factors as the barbarians' truculence, cruelty, and cunningness or the mobility of the cavalry did not provide convincing explanations. Perhaps there were other more important reasons? As can be expected, the rule of the golden section showed its miraculous power again: We can see that the battle formation of the Mongol cavalry was different from the Western traditional phalanx. In regard to their five-row formation, the ratio of heavy cavalry to light cavalry was 2:3, with 2 for armored heavy cavalry and 3 for fast and mobile light cavalry, that is, another example of the golden section! You have to admire the genius-level understanding achieved by that thinker on horseback. It was natural for a force under the command of such a commander to have more striking power than the European forces that it confronted.
It seems that, while highly gifted in applying the rule of the golden section to religion and arts, Christian Europeans were late in coming to understand the application of this rule to other spheres. The Dutch general Maurice, who had been the first to transform the traditional phalanx by mixing similar numbers of musket-armed soldiers and pike-armed soldiers, failed to realize this point even in the black powder period when muskets were gradually replacing pikes. It was King Gustavus of Sweden who adjusted this formation of a strong front and weak flanks, thereby turning the Swedish army into an army with the strongest combat power in Europe of that time. What he did was to have an additional 96 musket-armed soldiers in addition to the squadron composed of 216 pike-armed soldiers and 198 musket-armed soldiers. This change gave immediate prominence to the use of firearms, thereby becoming the watershed separating battle formations of the periods of cold weapons and hot weapons. Needless to say, we again saw the shining light of the rule of the golden section in the ratio of 198 plus 96 musket-armed soldiers to 216 pike-armed soldiers.
There is still more. Let us see how it had stubbornly "manifested" itself to give us clear suggestions before we recognized it as something more than a rule of arts. Napoleon attacked Russia in June 1812. In September, after failing to eliminate effective Russian forces in the Borodino battle, he entered Moscow. At that time, Napoleon did not realize that his genius and luck were gradually leaving him bit by bit, and that the peak and turning point of his lifelong career were approaching simultaneously. A month later, the French forces withdrew from Moscow as it snowed heavily. There were three months of victorious advance and two months of declining. It seems that, in terms of the time sequence, the French emperor was standing on the line of the golden section when looking down at the city of Moscow through the burning fire. In another June 130 years later, Nazi Germany started the Barbarossa Plan against the Soviet Union. For as long as two years, German forces maintained their offensive momentum. It was in August 1943 that German forces turned into defense at the conclusion of the Castle action and would no longer be able to launch an action that can be called a campaign against the Soviet forces. Perhaps we also have to call the following fact a coincidence: The battle of Stalingrad, which has been considered by all historians of war to be the turning point in the Soviet Patriotic War, happened exactly in the 17th month of the war, that is, November 1942. This was the "golden point" in the time axis encompassing 26 months during which the German forces turned from booming to declining.
Let us also take a look at the Gulf War. Before the war, military experts estimated that the equipment and personnel of the Republican Guards would basically lose their combat effectiveness when losses resulting from aerial attacks should total or exceed 30 percent. To make Iraqi forces' losses reach this critical point, U.S. forces extended the bombing time repeatedly. When the Desert Sword was taken out of its shield, Iraqi forces had lost 38 percent of their 4,280 tanks, 32 percent of their 2,280 armored vehicles, and 47 percent their 3,100 artillery pieces, and only around 60 percent of the strength of the Iraqi forces was left. Through such cruel data, the mysterious light of 0.618 began to flicker again in the early morning of 24 January 1991. The Desert Storm ground war ended 100 hours later.
Such instances scattered across history have truly been something marvelous. When viewed in isolation, they do look like accidents happening one after another. But the Creator never does anything without a reason. If too many accidents demonstrate the same phenomenon, can you still calmly view them as accidents? No, at this moment, you have to admit that there is a rule here.
Victory's Grammar--The Side-Principal Rule
In Chinese grammar, there is a basic sentence structure. This structure divides a sentence or phrase into two parts, the modifier and the center word. The relationship between them is that of modifying and being modified, that is, that the former modifies the latter and determines the tendency and features of the latter. Put more clearly, the former constitutes appearance, and the latter constitutes the organism. We usually determine the difference between one person or object with another person or object not according to his (its) existence as an organism or mechanism but according to his (its) appearance and look. From this perspective, relative to the center word, the modifier should, to a greater extent, be considered the center of a sentence or phrase. For instance, red apple. Before being modified by "red," apple only refers to a kind of fruit in general and is thus general in nature. But, "red" gives this apple a specificity that makes it possible to determine it to be "this one." Obviously, "red" plays a significant role in this phrase. Also, for instance, special economic zone. Without the word "economic," special zone is only a concept of geographical division. When modified by "economic," it acquires a special character and orientation, becoming the point of support for the economic lever used by Deng Xiaoping to reform China. This structure is a basic mode in Chinese grammar:
The side-principal structure.
This structure of having the principal element modified by a side element exists extensively in the Chinese language to the extent that a Chinese speaker will not be able to speak without using it. For, if there are only subject words in a sentence, without directing modification, the sentence will lack clarity because of the absence of such elements as degree, location, and mode which can be grasped in a concrete manner. For example, if the modifiers in such phrases as "good person," "good thing," "tall building," "red flag," and "slow running" are all removed, then the center words will all become neutral words without specific references. As shown here, in the side-principal structure, the "side" element, as compared with the "principal" element, is in the position of qualitatively determining the sentence or phrase. In other words, in a certain sense we can use the understanding that in the side-principal structure the center word is the principal entity, with the modifier serving as the directing element, that is, that the "principal" element is the body for the "side" element, while the "side" element is the soul of the "principal" element. With the body established as the premise, the role of the soul is obviously of decisive significance. The relationship of the principal entity's being subordinate to the directing element is the foundation for the existence of the side-principal structure. At the same time, as one of the forms of structure of the system of symbols corresponding to the objective world, it seems to suggest to us something lawlike which goes beyond the scope of language.
Going along this path, we will soon see that the side-principal relationship exists in a big way not only in such phrases as "good person," "bad thing," "tall building," and "red flag" or such military terms as aircraft carrier, cruise missile, stealth aircraft, armored personnel carrier, self- propelled artillery, precision bombs, rapid response force, air-land war, and joint operation. This relationship also exists everywhere in the world outside the scope of language in a myriad manner. This is the significance of our borrowing--just borrowing--but not copying this rhetorical device, only seen in human language systems, in our theory. We do not intend to arbitrarily juxtapose war with rhetoric, but only intend to borrow the term "side-principal" to enunciate the deepest core element of our theory. For we believe this side-principal relationship exists in a big way in the movement and development of many things, and that in such a relationship the "side" element, instead of the "principal" element, often plays the role as the directing element. For the time being, we describe this role as "modification by the side element of the principal element" (note: this is not the original meaning of the side-principal structure as a rhetorical device, but an extended meaning as used by us). For instance, in a country, the people are the principal entity, while government is the directing element of the country; in an armed force, soldiers and middle- and lower-level officers constitute the principal entity, while the command headquarters constitute the directing element of the armed force; in a nuclear explosion, uranium or plutonium is the principal entity, while the means of bombarding them constitute the directing element for triggering chain reactions; in a Southeast Asian-style financial crisis, the victim countries are the principal entities, while financial speculators are the directing element generating the crisis. Without the direction provided by government, the people will be a heap of loose sand; without the direction provided by the command headquarters, soldiers will constitute a mob; without means of bombardment, uranium and plutonium will be a heap of minerals; without financial speculators' activity to create disturbance, the regulating mechanisms of victim countries should have enabled them to avoid financial catastrophes. In such a relationship, if the factor of two-way interactions is put aside, it is self-evident which is the side element, which is the principal element, and which modifies which.
As shown through discussions above, this side-principal structure is an asymmetrical structure. Thus, the relationship between the side element and the principal element is an unbalanced relationship. On this point, the situation is very similar to that regarding the rule of the golden section: 0.618 and 1 form an asymmetrical structure and an unbalanced relationship. We are fully justified in regarding it as another way of stating the side-principal formula. For, in this side- principal structure, what is important is the side element, but not the principal element. This is also true with the rule of the golden section. What is important is 0.618, but not 1. This is the common feature of the two. Laws tell us that two things with similar features must follow some similar rules. If there is any common rule governing the golden section and the side-principal structure, it should be the following:
0.618 = deviation toward the side element
The best case to illustrate this point is perhaps the story of Tian Ji's horse racing. In a situation of inferior overall strength, the great military strategist Sun Bin made his classical move which was an adequate example of Chinese gaming wisdom. He started by racing Tian Ji's worst horse with the best horse of the king of Qi. After inevitably losing that race, he used his side's middle and best horses to beat the opponent's worst and middle horses, thereby ensuring the two-win advantage necessary for achieving a victory. This method of using the strategy of losing one and winning two (directing element) to win the overall game (principal element) can be viewed as having a typical side-principal structure. The result of winning two of three games conformed entirely to the golden ratio of 2:3. Here, we are seeing the perfect confluence and unity of the two rules:
The golden rule = the side-principal rule.
Finding a rule is both the end and the beginning of studying an issue. As long as we believe that something called the side-principal rule can be seen in the functioning of all things, we should also believe that this rule, like the rule of the golden section, will not leave the military sphere untouched.
Facts are indeed so.
The Changshao battle between Qi and Lu: As the two forces confronted each other on theattlefield, the Qi force was very aggressive, but the Lu force remained motionless. The Qi force attacked three times with three rounds of drum beating but failed to unsettle the front of the Lu force, resulting in an obvious decline in momentum. The Lu force took the opportunity to launch a counterattack, achieving a complete victory. After the battle, the advisor Cao Gui revealed the reason for Qi's defeat and Lu's victory in this battle: The enemy force "had a great momentum at the first round of drum beating, had a weaker momentum at the second round, and was exhausted at the third round. As the enemy force was exhausted, while our force had full vigor, our force prevailed." The entire process of the battle can be divided into five phases: the Qi force's first round of drum beating--the Qi force's second round of drum beating--the Qi force's third round of drum beating--the Lu force's counterattack--the Lu force's chase. From the first to third phases, Cao Gui adopted the strategy of avoiding the enemy's attack, so that the Qi force quickly passed the golden point of its attack power without achieving any results. Meanwhile the Lu force precisely selected this point as the time of counterattack, thereby fully testifying to the rule of the golden section on the battlefield 2,700 years ago (3:5 approximately equals 0.618). It can be certain that at that time Cao Gui could not have known Pythagoras and his theory of the golden section of 200 years later. Furthermore, even if he had known the theory, it was not possible to accurately determine where the 0.618 point was amid an ongoing battle. But, by instinct, he found the point of section with flickering golden light. This is a gift common to all military geniuses.
Hannibal thought in the exactly same way as Cao Gui during the Cannae battle. As Cao Gui did, he understood the secret of declining attack power of enemy forces. Thus, unusually, he deployed the weakest force from Gaul and Spanish infantry at the center of the front where the best force should have been deployed, letting such weak forces to bear attacks from Roman forces. As such forces were unable to withstand the attacks, there gradually emerged a crescent- shaped indentation. Whether this curve was created intentionally by Hannibal or accidentally, it became a huge buffer for absorbing the attack power of the Roman forces. As this strong power gradually weakened because of the lengthening of the front and came to the low point of its momentum at the time of approaching the bottom part of the Carthaginian front, the Carthaginians, who were inferior in overall strength but superior in cavalry force, quickly launched their flanking cavalry forces to complete the encirclement of the Roman forces, thus turning Cannae into a killing field for killing 70,000 people.
The two battles were different but had a common way of working. In both, the dominant strategy was to evade enemy frontal attacks and to weaken the enemy momentum. An operational approach of obviously deviating from frontal fighting was adopted, and the point of decline of enemy attack power was properly selected as the optimal moment for the relevant forces' own counterattacks. The operational method used obviously conformed to the rule of the golden section and the side-principal rule.
If the two cases of warfare are not viewed as coincidental or isolated phenomena, then we will see the shining of the light of the rule of the golden section move widely in the history of war. This point has been perhaps even more prominent in modern warfare. During the Second World War, the entire German operation of attacking France was immersed in the pith of the two rules that we discussed. Such moves as changing tanks from being subordinate to infantry to being the main battle weapons, using blitzkrieg as the main operational doctrine on the basis of discarding First World War practices, and selecting the Ardennes mountains as the main direction of attack of the German forces, an action which surprised not only the enemy but also conceptually obsolete old generals at the German high command, must have seemed to be unorthodox and had a prominent character of deviation toward the side element. It was this deviation character that led to the fundamental change in military thinking of the entire German military and also made Schlieffen's dream of "sweeping across the English Channel" a nightmare for the British at Dunkirk. Before that time, who would have thought that the blueprint of this miracle would come from the hands of two relatively low-level officers--Manstein and Guderian?
During the same world war, there was also the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which was similar to the operation of attacking France, an operation with a prominent side-principal tendency. Isoroko Yamamoto used aircraft carriers in the same way Guderian used tanks. Conceptually, Yamamoto still viewed battleships as the main force for decisive naval battles in the future, but sensitively and correctly selected aircraft carriers and their carrier-borne aircraft as the principal weapons for operations against the U.S. Navy. More interestingly, he did not carry out frontal attacks on the long Pacific coast of the continental United States when launching attacks on the Americans. At the same time, he fully considered the attack radius of his joint fleet, that is, the optimal location that his fist was capable of hitting. Thus he selected, as the point of attack, Hawaii which, while being of critical importance to controlling the entire Pacific Ocean, the Americans refused to believe to be the point of attack even after receiving intelligence before the operation. As should be pointed out, this believer in decisive naval battles chose a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, instead of a naval battle dreamed about by him all the time, in the first major battle bearing on the future course of the war. Consequently, he won a victory with surprising moves by hitting side targets.
With the analysis above, we should understand that neither the rule of the golden section nor the side-principal rule should be understood literally in a narrow manner; instead it is necessary to grasp their essence. A rapidly changing battlefield will give any military leader or commander neither adequate time nor adequate information for carefully determining the point of the golden section or the degree of deviation toward the side element. Even the two core elements of the two rules, 0.618 and "deviation toward the side element," are not constants in a mathematical sense. Rather, they represent the thousands of manifestations of the god of victory in ever-changing courses of wars, battlefields, and war situations.
It is sometimes manifested in the selection of means. For instance, during the Gulf War, Schwartzkopf used aerial bombings as the dominant means, while using as supporting forces the army and the navy which had always been the main combat forces.
It is sometimes manifested in the selection of tactics. For instance, Donitz changed ship-to-ship naval warfare into submarines' attacks on merchant ships; this "Wolfpack" tactic posed a much greater threat to Britain than naval battles.
It is sometimes manifested in the selection of weapons. For instance, Napoleon's artillery, Guderian's tanks, Yamamoto's aircraft carriers, and the precision ammunition used in Operation Gold Coast were all main weapons which were able to shift the balance in war.
It is sometimes manifested in the selection of the point of attack. For instance, during the Trafalgar naval battle, Nelson wisely selected the rear portion, instead of the forward portion, of the French fleet as the main point of attack, thereby producing a naval war victory, which would lead to the birth of a maritime empire. 
It is sometimes manifested in the selection of opportunities of fighting, For instance, in the Fourth Middle East War, Sadat selected 6 October, in the month of Ramadan for Muslims, as the D-day for Egyptian forces' crossing of the Suez Canal, and launched the attack in the afternoon when sunlight, going from west to east, was directed at the pupils of the Israeli's eyes, thereby demolishing the myth of Israeli invincibility. 
It is sometimes manifested in the uneven deployment of forces. For instance, before the First World War, the German High Command formulated the Schlieffen Plan for invading France, planning the bold move of deploying 53 of the 72 German divisions on the right flank to be used as the main attacking force and deploying the remaining 19 divisions along the long frontlines of the left flank and the center. In this way, the sand-table exercise became the most famous war plan in history which was never implemented.
It is sometimes manifested in the use of stratagem. For instance, in 260 BC, there was a rivalry between Qin and Zhao. The Zhaoxiang King of Qin was not in a hurry to have a decisive battle with the enemy, and adopted Fan Sui's advice, first attacking Shangdang in Han to deprive Zhao of its backing. Then he faked a willingness to negotiate a peace, and, as a result, the lords stopped giving assistance to Zhao. He used the stratagem of sowing discord, and, as a result, the king of Zhao dismissed General Lian Po and appointed armchair strategist Zhao Kuo as commander. As a consequence, the Zhao force was defeated at Changping. Qin's victory and Zhao's defeat in this battle should be, more properly, be attributed to Fan Sui's stratagem, rather than to the Qin force's powerfulness. 
We should also pay focused attention to and study another phenomenon, that is, that more and more countries are looking beyond the military sphere when handling important issues such as political, economic, and national security issues. They use other means to supplement, enrich, or even replace military means, so as to achieve objectives which cannot be achieved by military force alone. This has been the most important episode of the side element's modifying the principal element in relation to war on the basis of a conception of war. At the same time, this also indicates that in future wars there will be increasingly frequent occurrences of the side- principal structure formed by the military means and other means.
All the selections discussed above had the character of "deviation toward the side element." Like the rule of the golden section, the side-principal rule is opposed to all forms of parallel placement, balance, symmetry, being all-encompassing, and smoothness, but, instead, advocates using the sword to cut the side. Only by avoiding frontal collisions, will it be possible for your sword to cut apart things without being damaged. This is the most basic grammar of victory for the ancient article of war.
If we call the rule of the golden section in the sphere of art the rule of aesthetics, then why do we not also call the side-principal rule--its mirror image in the military sphere--the rule of victory?
The Dominant Element and the Whole Thing: the Essence of the Side-Principal Structure Among the many internal elements comprising a thing, there must be a certain element which assumes a prominent or dominant position among all the elements. If the relationship between this element and the other elements is harmonious and perfect, it will be in accord with the 0.618:1 formula in some places and, also, in accord with the side-principal rule. For, here, "all the elements" constitute the main body, that is, the principal element; the "certain element" serves as the directing element and is thus the side element. Once an object has acquired specific purposefulness, the side element and the principal element will form a dominant-subordinate relationship. When two bulls fight, the bulls constitute the principal element, while the horns constitute the side element. When two swords are pitted against each other, the swords constitute the principal element, while the edges constitute the side element. It is very clear which is dominant and which is subordinate. When the purpose is changed, a new dominant element will emerge and replace the old dominant element and form a new side-principal relationship with all the existing elements. Grasping the relationship between the dominant element and all the elements in an object is tantamount to grasping the essence of the rule of the golden section and the side-principal rule.
On the basis of such an understanding, we can quickly establish five most important relationships among all the complex relationships of war: the dominant weapons and all the weapons; the dominant means and all the means; the dominant force and all the forces; the dominant direction and all the directions; and the dominant sphere and all the spheres. The relationship between the five dominant elements and all the elements in the five areas basically represent the side-principal relationship which exists in wars in a widespread manner. Take again the example of the Gulf War. In Operation Desert Storm, the dominant weapons used by the Allied forces were stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and precision bombs, with all other weapons playing a subordinate role. The dominant means was the 38 consecutive days of aerial bombardment, with other means playing a supplemental role. The dominant force was the air force, with all other forces playing a supporting role. The dominant direction was to hit the Republican Guards as the target of focused attacks, with all other battlefield targets serving as secondary targets. The dominant sphere was the military sphere, with all other spheres providing comprehensive support in the forms of economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and media offensives.
However, it is not our goal to just clarify such relationships. To people engaged in war, what is the most important is not to clarify things but to grasp and apply such relationships. As we know, all countries' war resources are limited. Even such a powerful country as the United States still has to continually think about cost-effectiveness (the principal of the "least consumption of energy") and how to fight wars in a more marvelous way and to produce more splendid war results. Therefore, it is very necessary for any country to use and allocate war resources in a sound and strategic manner. This will require finding a correct method, that is, the issue of how to consciously apply the side-principal rule. In fact, many countries have already subconsciously applied this rule before now --
After the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, Russia's military capability has declined continually. It has not only lost its superpower position of confronting the U.S. forces, but has even found it difficult to maintain national security now. Under such circumstances, the Russian high command has adjusted its future strategy in a timely fashion, despite being in a difficult position, making tactical, or even strategic, nuclear weapons the dominant weapons of first choice if a war is launched against Russia. On the basis of this decision, it has also adjusted the distribution of conventional weapons and nuclear weapons in an overall way. Contrary to Russia, being the only superpower in the world, the U.S. Armed Forces have established as their new strategic objectives for the three services a "comprehensively superior" (army),  a (navy) "moving from sea to land," and a "globally engaged" (air force)."  On that basis, digitized equipment, new types of amphibious attack vessels, and long-range stealth aircraft have been selected as a new generation of weapons, which appear to be replacing contemporary trump cards like tanks of the M-1 series, aircraft carriers, and F-16 fighters as the dominant weapons in the U.S. arsenal.
As can be seen in the strategic adjustments made by Russia and the United States in regard to their respective dominant weapons, it seems that the practice of selecting the dominant weapons on the basis of the magnitude of destructive power is obsolete. As far as the selection of the dominant weapons is concerned, the destructive power of weapons is but one of many items of technical performance of weapons. What is more important than technical performance is the basic consideration of the war aim, operational objectives, and security environment. Thus, the dominant weapons should be the most effective weapons for accomplishing the above-mentioned goals. Furthermore, it is necessary to have them organically combined with other weapons, so as to formulate the dominant element of a complete arms system. Under conditions of modern technology, dominant weapons are no longer individual weapons, but "systems of weapons," which are also components of larger systems.  The emergence of a lot of high and new technology and the continual adjustment of war aims have provided enough space for the selection of dominant weapons and the combination of dominant weapons with other weapons, and have, at the same time, also made the dominant-subordinate relationship between dominant weapons and the other weapons even more complicated. 
The same factors are also affecting the use of the means of war. It is becoming obsolete to automatically consider military action the dominant means and the other means supporting means in war. Perhaps, in the not too distant future, the military means will be only one of all the available means in wars such as one of fighting terrorist organizations of the bin Laden category. A more effective means that can strike at bin Laden in a destructive way is perhaps not the cruise missile, but a financial suffocation war carried out on the Internet.
As means have become more complicated, there has emerged a consequence that is unexpected to all soldiers: the civilianization of war. Therefore, here the issue of the relationship between the dominant force and all forces under discussion here also encompasses the issue of degree of participation of the entire population in war, in addition to the deployment, allocation, and use of military forces in combat operations. As professional soldiers' war or quasi-war activities have increasingly become an important factor affecting national security, the issue as to which constitute the dominant force in future wars, an issue which has never been a question, has become a question worldwide. For example, the incidents of attacks conducted by "web rascals" on the network centers of the U.S. Defense Department and the Indian Defense Ministry were evidence in this regard.
Whether an action is a pure war action, a nonwar military action, or a nonmilitary war action, any action of a combat nature will entail an issue of how to accurately select the main direction of operation and the main point of attack, that is, to determine your main orientation in view of all the factors of the war concerned, the battlefields, and the battle fronts. This is the most difficult issue even for all those commanders who are in control of good weapons, a multitude of means, and sufficient manpower. However, Alexander, Hannibal, Nelson, and Nimitz as well as Sun Wu and Sun Bin of ancient China were good at selecting main directions of attack which would surprise enemy forces completely. Liddle Hart also noted this point. He referred to the approach of selecting the line of least resistance and the direction of action least expected by the enemy as the "indirect strategy." As the arena of war has expanded, encompassing the political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and psychological spheres, in addition to the land, sea, air, space, and electronics spheres, the interactions among all factors have made it difficult for the military sphere to serve as the automatic dominant sphere in every war. War will be conducted in nonwar spheres. This notion sounds strange and is difficult to accept, but more and more signs indicate that this is the trend. In fact, even in ancient times, war was not always confined to one single sphere. Lian Xiangru's diplomatic battle of "returning the jade in an undamaged condition to Zhao" and the virtual war conducted by Mo Zi and Gongshu Ban were classical examples of winning or precluding a war with nonmilitary actions. This method of resolving the problem of war through actions in multiple spheres should give insights to people today. The era of comprehensive use of highly developed technologies has provided us with much greater room for applying wisdom and means than ancient people, so that people's dream of winning military victories in nonmilitary spheres and winning wars with nonwar means can now become reality. If we want to have victory in future wars, we must be fully prepared intellectually for this scenario, that is, to be ready to carry out a war which, affecting all areas of life of the countries involved, may be conducted in a sphere not dominated by military actions. It is now still unknown what weapons, means, and personnel such wars will use and in what direction and sphere such wars will be conducted.
What is known is one point, that is, that whatever the mode of warfare, victory always belongs to the side which correctly uses the side-principal rule to grasp the relationship between the "dominant" and the "whole."
A Rule, Not a Set Formula
War is the most difficult to explain and understand. It needs support from technology, but technology cannot substitute for morale and stratagem; it needs artistic inspiration, but rejects romanticism and sentimentalism; it needs mathematical precision, but precision can sometimes render it mechanical and rigid; it needs philosophical abstraction, but pure thinking does not help to seize short-lived opportunities amid iron and fire.
This is no formula of war. No one dares to arrogantly claim to have the perfect method in the sphere of war. No one has ever been able to use one method to win all wars. But, it does not mean that there are no rules regarding war. A few people have had their names listed in the roster of ever-victorious generals because they have discovered and grasped rules of victory. Those names testify to the existence of rules of victory, but no one has revealed the secret. For a long time--almost as long as the history of war--people have regarded them as flashes of electricity in the brains of gifted commanders, but have seldom realized that they are hidden in bloody fighting characterized by collisions of swords and the smoke of gunpowder. In fact, any rule is like a sheet of paper, and what is important is whether you are able to poke a hole in it.
The side-principal rule is just such a sheet of paper. It is both simple and complicated and both fluctuating and stable. As has often happened, a person with a lucky finger sometimes unintentionally pokes a hole in it, and the door of victory opens to him immediately. It is so simple that it can be expressed by a set of digits or a rule of grammar. It is so complicated that you are unable to find an answer even if you are proficient in mathematics and grammar. It is like smoke and is difficult to grasp. It is as constant as a shadow and accompanies every sunrise of victory.
Consequently, we regard the side-principal rule as a principle, but not a theorem. We have taken full account of the relativity of the principle. Relative things should not be applied mechanically and require no precise measurement. Relativity is not absolute whiteness, and thus does not fear black swans. 
However, through study of the history of war, we have determined that the side-principal rule is a rule of victory, but how it can be used correctly will be an issue for each individual operator to determine in view of the particular circumstances. For the phenomenon of antimony in war has always puzzled every person pursuing victory: those acting against the laws will undoubtedly fail, but those sticking to set practices are also unlike to win. "Six multiplied by 6 is 36. There are stratagems in numbers, and there are numbers in stratagems. The yin and the yang are coordinated. Opportunities are there. It is not possible to manufacture opportunities. Manufacturing will not work." The "36 stratagems" constitute the revealing of the way things work. That is, no matter how many examples of war we can find to demonstrate that the causes of victories involved were in accord with 0.618, the next person who plans a war, battle, or engagement strictly in accordance with the rule of the golden section will almost certainly eat the bitter fruit of defeat. Whether the rule of the golden section or the side-principal rule is involved, the key is to grasp the essence and apply the principle, instead of making mechanical applications, as the legendary Dong Shi emulated the beauty Xi Shi. In the famous Rossbach battle and the Luzern battle in European history, the attacking sides in both cases used the Alexander-style "diagonal attack formation," but the results were totally different. In the Rossbach battle, commanders of the French-Austrian force copied the history of war faithfully. They made troop movements and built battle formations right under the eyes of Frederick the Great. The French-Austrian force attempted to use the diagonal formation to attack the left wing of the Prussian force. As a result, it was thoroughly beaten by the Prussian force which made adjustments in deployment in a timely manner. A year later, at Luzern, Frederick again encountered an Austrian force which was three times as large as Frederick's force. But, this time, he performed brilliantly. He also used the diagonal attack formation, but managed to annihilate the Austrian force. It is thought-provoking that the same method of operation produced entirely different results.  This incident tells us that there are no method of war which is always right. There are only rules which are always correct. It also tells us that correct rules do not guarantee that there will always be victories; the secret to victory is to correctly apply rules. Similarly, with regard to the side-principal rule, the emphasis is on using the side element for modifying the principal element, but it is not the case that deviation toward the side-element will always produce a victory. Deviation toward the side element means mainly deviation in terms of lines of thought and essence, instead of deviation in form. For instance, in actual warfare, it is not the case that every time the point of attack should be located at the point of deviation in a 0.618 style in order to be in accord with rules of victory. It is possible that this time, rules of victory call for frontal breakthroughs. Thus, this time, the "principal" element is the "side" element. This is the nature of war as art. This art element cannot be replaced by mathematics, philosophy or other areas of science and technology.  Thus, we are sure that in this sense the military technological revolution cannot replace the revolution in the art of military affairs. As should also be indicated, the side-principal principle is unavoidably similar to the "surprise- non-suprise" principle advocated by ancient Chinese strategists; nevertheless they are not entirely the same. For, ancient strategists advocated the use of surprise moves and non-surprise moves at different times. As Sun Zi said, "in fighting, it is necessary to use non-suprise moves to gather strength and to use surprise moves to achieve victory. Fighting entails just surprise and non-surprise moves. There is endless change to the use of surprise and non-surprise moves."  The side element and the principal element are not two methods which can each be used without the other, but are an expression of an objective law. The most important distinction is the following: It is certainly true that in the history of war the cases of winning with surprise moves have all been marvelous because of their excellent execution, but not all victories have been achieved through surprise moves. There have also been many examples of achieving victories through non-surprise moves. The side-principal principle is different. Through analysis, the trace of the rule of victory can be seen in every victory, whether the victory has been achieved through surprise or non-surprise moves: that is, that the victory is the effect of the side-principal principle demonstrated in either in a "surprise" or "non-surprise" way.
No matter how clear we state the side-principal rule or the rule of victory, we can only proceed with the application of the rule in a fuzzy way. Sometimes, being fuzzy is the best way of reaching clarity. For only fuzziness is good for being grasped in an overall manner. This is the Eastern style of thinking. But, in a peculiar way, it has met Occidental wisdom at the golden point of 0.618. As a result, Occidental logic, reasoning, and precision and Eastern instinct, understanding, and murkiness have provided the basis for joining Eastern and Occidental military wisdom and have generated the rule of victory that we have discussed. It shines with glitter, has both Eastern mystery and Occidental rigor, as if eaves at the Taihe Palace are placed on a column at the Pathernon Temple, looking majestic and vibrant.
 Pythagoras was a philosopher and mathematician of ancient Greece whose famous axiom was, "Everything is a matter of numbers." That is, all existing things can be viewed, in the final analysis, as relationships of numbers. In Pythagoras' theory, things rational and things nonrational were mixed, but his theory still exerted profound influences on the development of ancient Greek philosophy and Medieval European thought. Copernicus recognized Pythagoras' astronomical concepts as precursors of his proposition. Galileo was also considered an advocate of Pythagoras' theory. Using the golden section to demonstrate harmonious relationships in the world was only one specific application of Pythagoras thinking; see Concise Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol 1, p 715.
 See Summerson, Classical Language of Architecture, p 90.
 Divide a straight line of the length of L into two sections in such a way that the ratio of one section to the entire line equals the ratio of the other section to this section, that is, X:L=(L-X):X. Such a division is called the "golden section," and the ratio is approximately 0.618. From ancient Greece to the 19th century, people believed this ratio was of aesthetic value in formative art. In actual application, the simplest method is to use as approximate values such ratios as 2:3, 3:5, 5:8, and 8:13 produced on the basis of the series of numbers of 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21 . . . ; see Ci Hai [A Grand Dictionary] (Shanghai Dictionary Press), 1980, pp 2057-2058.
 Dive bombing is a main method used by attack aircraft to launch short-range missiles, rockets, and guided and unguided bombs. During an attack, an attack aircraft flies at a low altitude to reach the combat point (40-50 km from targets) and then rises to 2,000-4,000 meters, changing into the combat direction. At 5-10 km from the target, it begins to dive and drops ordinance at 1,300-1,600 meters and 600-1,000 meters from angles of 30-50 degrees. In diving attacks, weapons' destructive precision is the highest [graph omitted]; see the Russian periodical, Foreign Military Reviews, No. 10 (1992).
 See Zhongguo Lidai Zhanzheng Shi [The History of War of China] (Military Translation Press), Vol 1, pp 257-273, illustrations 1-26 of the annex.
 See Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, Vol 1, p 117. This book contains a good analysis of the battle of Arbela and also illustrations graphically depicting the situations of the battlefield.
 Masaier Boduo (France), Di Er Ci Shijie Dazhan Lishi Baikequanshu [Encyclopedia of the History of World War II] (PLA Press, 1988). "The Soviet Union's War Against Germany," pp 684-694.
 See "Biographies of Sun Zi and We Qi," in Shi Ji [Records of History].
 See "Cao Gui's Analysis of War," in Zuo Zhuan. Later, when participating in the Qi-Lu meeting at Ke, Cao Gui seized Duke Heng of Qi with a knife, thereby forcing Qi to return to Lu land seized from Lu. He was a good general, with both courage and wisdom; see "Biographies of Assassins," in Shi Ji.
 The battle of Cannae was the most famous battle in Western History and has been mentioned in almost all works on the history of war. The book How Great Generals Win, written by Bevin Alexander (U.S.), depicts the battle of Cannae vividly with the support of illustrations, and can help to understand the "side-principal rule" that we have discussed; see Tongshuai Juesheng Zhi Dao [How Great Generals Win] (Xinhua Press, 1996), pp 11-13.
 In 1937-1938 Manstein was the first deputy chief of staff of the German Army. Because of internal conflicts in the German Army, Manstein was expelled from the Army Command and became commander of the 18th Division. In 1939, the German Army Command issued an operational plan for the western front, the "Yellow Operation Plan," indicating the intention to use frontal assaults carried out by strong right flank forces to defeat the British-French forces expected to be encountered in Belgium, while using weaker forces to cover the flanks. Obviously, this plan was a refurbished version of the 1914 Schliffen Plan. Manstein, then chief of staff of Group Army A, formulated his own operational plan in the name of Group Army A. He submitted the plan to the Army Command repeatedly in the form of a memorandum or a draft operational plan. But it was rejected by high-raking generals of the Army Command each time. Annoyed at Manstein, the Army Command transferred Manstein to the post of commander of the 38th Army. Manstein reported to Hitler his ideas by taking advantage of his meeting with Hitler, and persuaded Hitler who, entirely a layman in the area of military affairs, had a high level of capacity for understanding. The main point of one plan, called the Manstein Plan by Liddle Hart after the war, was to conduct a surprise attack through the Ardennes mountains, conducting focused assaults on the left flank and using armored forces in a concentrated way; see Mansitanyin [Manstein], Shiqu de Shenli [Lost Victory] (The Academy of Military Science of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, 1980). Guderian was commander of the 19th Armored Army and the best implementing agent of the Manstein Plan; see Gudeli'an [Guderian], Shanji Yingxiong [Blitzkrieg Heroes] (Zhanshi Press, 1981).
 After becoming commander of a joint fleet, Yamamoto rejected the Japanese Navy staff's idea of attacking the Philippines first and believed it necessary to launch a sneak attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet first, so as to paralyze it. On 7 December 1941, under General Nagumo's command, 6 aircraft carriers with 423 aircraft attacked Pearl Harbor according to Yamamoto's plan, sinking the battleship Arizona and three other battleships of the U.S. Navy and destroying 188 aircraft, greatly damaging the U.S. Pacific Fleet; see Liddle Hart, History of the Second World War, pp 276-335.
 Before the Trafalgar naval battle, Nelson told his subordinate captains a "secret method," that is, to change the traditional naval linear operational method by dividing the warships into two groups. One group would attack the middle of the enemy fleet at a 90-degree angle, separating the rear portion from the middle portion. Then concentrated force would attack ships of the rear portion of the enemy fleet. Another group would separate the middle portion from the forward portion and conduct a concentrated attack on the middle portion. It would be too late when ships of the forward portion of the enemy fleet should try to come back to provide help. The Trafalgar naval battle proceeded almost exactly as Nelson predicted. Although he was killed from a battle wound, the British Navy achieved a complete victory; see Ding Chaobi, Shijie Jindai Haizhan Shi [The History of Modern Naval Wars of the World] (Haiyang Press, 1994), pp 143-155.
 Geha'erde Kangce'erman [as printed 2706 0761 1422 1795 1660 4595 1422 2581] (Germany), Di Si Ci Zhongdong Zhanzheng [The Fourth Middle East War] (Shangwu Press, 1975); Qiaoen Jinqi [as printed 0829 1869 6855 1142] (U.S.) and others, Zhongdong Zhanzheng [Middle East Wars] (Shanghai Translation Press, 1979).
 See Zhongguo Lidai Zhanzheng Shi [The History of War in China] (Military Translation Press), vol 2, p 197.
 "Comprehensive superiority" was a strategic goal advocated by the U.S. Army in its document, "Conception of the Army in 2010."
 "Global engagement" was a 21st-century air force development strategy put forward by the U.S. Air Force at the end of 1997 to replace the "global force for global reach" strategic doctrine used to deal with the situation after the Cold War. In this respect, the six core areas of capability of the air force were emphasized: air and space superiority; global attack; global rapid mobility; precision strike; information superiority; and flexible operational support; see "Global Engagement and the Conception of the U.S. Air Force in the 21st Century."
 The concept of the "system of systems" was the result of joint research conducted by Admiral Owens, the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and his senior advisor, Black. According to Owens, the contemporary military technological revolution is no longer a matter of revolution with regard to warships, aircraft, tanks, and other weapon platforms, but there has been the entry of such factors as sensor systems, communication systems, and precision guided weapons systems. The entry of such systems will generate a fundamental revolution in the force structure and modes of operation of the military. Perhaps, in the future, there should no longer be the division into an army, a navy, and an air force, but the division into a "sensor force," "mobile striking force," and "smart support force"; see the interview of Owens by Chen Bojiang, Guofang Daxue Xuebao, Xiandai Junshi, and Shijie Junshi.
 We do not support the optimistic view of the technology faction with regard to the military revolution. We do not believe that technology can penetrate the fog of the "contingency" of war, for contingency in war does not come from physical or geographical obstacles, but from people's minds.
 The side-principal rule is not the kind of theorem such as the statements that "all men will die" and that "all swans are white." Rather it is a rule for guiding people to victory in war.
 See Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, Vol 2, p 201; A Concise History of War, p 86.
 We do not reject or neglect mathematical analysis, especially in the era of widespread use of computers and in this country of ours where there is a tradition of advocating fuzziness and a dislike of precision. In his Guoji Zhengzhi Yu Junshi Wenti Ruogan Shulianghua Fenxi Fangfa [Several Methods of Quantitative Analysis of International Political and Military Issues], Li Hongzhi mentioned the use by Nigula Shiweite [as printed 1441 0657 2139 2457 1218 3676] of the "Beiyete [as printed 6296 0673 3676] method" to analyze the Vietnam War, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the Arab-Israeli wars. In 1993 Li Hongzhi and others made accurate forecasts of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war by using the method; see Guoji Zhengzhi Yu Junshi Wenti Ruogan Shulianghua Fenxi Fangfa (Military Science Press).
 The quotation is from "Momentum," in Sun Zi Binfa [Art of War by Sun Zi]. The "surprise-
non-surprise" principle is an important concept used by ancient military strategists in relation to
methods of war. To unpredictably make moves unexpected by the enemy is the "surprise"
method; to confront the enemy on the battlefield in an open manner is the "non-surprise" method.
Emperor Taizong of Tang had a good understanding of the "surprise-non-surprise principle." The
Weiqing engagement was an example in this regard. "A Dialogue Between Emperor Taizong of
Tang and Li Weigong" recorded the views of Li Shimin and Li Jing on the "surprise-non-
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